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INTRODUCTION

Since when did the nondelegation doctrine' apply to statutory interpretation? According to the United States Supreme Court, as well as
the D.C. Circuit, the nondelegation doctrine, as the name implies,
1. One author describes the nondelegation doctrine this way:
The Congress may delegate both rulemaking and administrative functions to
the executive branch or agencies it establishes.

Today the Supreme Court will allow Congress to share its legislative
power with the executive branch by delegating aspects of that power to executive agencies. Such legislative delegations will be upheld unless Congress

abdicates one of its powers to the executive agency or fails to give legislative
definition of the scope of the agency's power.
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states that the legislature may not delegate authority vested in Congress by the Constitution.2 In other words, only Congress can legislate. It has been held, however, that other branches of the
government may assist Congress and even promulgate subordinate
rules or regulations which implement or execute the law as written by
Congress.3
On May 14, 1999, 4 however, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit applied a contorted version of the nondelegation doctrine. In
American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit struck down the
EPA's revised National Ambient Air Quality Standards5 (NAAQS)
ruling that "the construction of the Clean Air Act on which EPA relied in promulgating the NAAQS... effects an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power." 6 The court did not find that the Clean
Air Act itself was unconstitutional. Instead, the court stated that the
statutory language lent itself to an interpretation involving an unconstitutional delegation of power. 7
In American Trucking, the court ruled that although the EPA's chosen construction of the Clean Air Act constituted an excessive delegation of legislative authority, a permissible construction was available.8
Assuming arguendo this is true, even a permissible construction would
not remedy an unconstitutional delegation because it is not merely a
matter of interpretation. If a delegation of authority transcends the
Constitution, Congress is the only body that may render the delegation valid by amending the Act to conform to constitutional requirements. To hold otherwise would be to allow the artful pleader to
cleverly disguise his disagreement with a statutory interpretation as an
argument against an excessive delegation, which has not in fact occurred. Moreover, the judiciary, in such a case, by forcing the adminJOHN

E.

NOWAK

&

RONALD

D.

ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

156-57 (5th ed.

1995).
2. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935);
Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971).
3. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 530 (reasoning that the Constitution
is flexible and allows Congress to utilize selected instrumentalities in making
subordinate rules); Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 421 (stating that without the ability to
elicit help from "selected instrumentalities," exertion of legislative power would in
many instances be futile); see also Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. at 746
(reasoning that the delegation is permissible so long as Congress has provided an
"intelligible principle" to guide the agency).
4. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), reh'g
denied per curiam on nondelegation issue, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
5. National standards that are set by the EPA and which are designed to improve
air quality and protect the public health and welfare. See Clean Air Act § 109, 42
U.S.C. § 7409 (1994). While the standards are nationally applicable, the states are
responsible for their attainment and enforcement. Id. § 7401(a)(3).
6. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 175 F.3d at 1033.
7. Id. at 1038.
8. See id.
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istrative agency to "try again," is, in effect, legislating and imposing its
own judgment for that of the agency.
Unfortunately, in American Trucking the Court did not address the
constitutionality of the Clean Air Act itself by applying the test set out
in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States9 to determine if in
fact an unconstitutional delegation was present. 10 Rather, the court
remanded the NAAQS to the EPA to be revised in accordance with a
permissible interpretation of the statute. 1 Put another way, the court
did not agree with the NAAQS and remanded them so that the EPA
could find a more agreeable solution. The court in American Trucking
clearly misapplied the nondelegation doctrine, making clear that the
case should have been decided on the principle of deference articulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 2 It is the deference principle that applies to statutory interpretations made by administrative agencies, not the nondelegation
doctrine.
Prior to the landmark decision in Chevron, the conflicting pronouncements of the lower federal courts created an ambiguity in the
law and, essentially, a struggle for power between the judiciary and
administrative agencies. 3 This conflict may be resolved and clarity
achieved by acknowledging that the nondelegation doctrine should
not be applied to statutory interpretation, regardless of how it has
been used, or misused, by the judiciary since 1935.11 The nondelegation doctrine applies only to the legislature and serves as a safeguard
against abdication of its law-making responsibility. 5 Where a statute
confers legislative power not violative of the Constitution and where it
is the agency's interpretation of that statute that is called into doubt,
the deference doctrine articulated in Chevron should apply.
The courts that have used, or misused as the case may be, the
nondelegation doctrine to attack statutory interpretations made by
administrative agencies have exercised what has been called "result9. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
10. In that case, the Supreme Court stated that, in determining whether an unconstitutional delegation has occurred, the court must look to the statute to see if Congress has "established the standards of legal obligation, thus performing its essential
legislative function." Id. at 530. In other words, has Congress laid down an intelligible
principle, or framework, to which the EPA must conform?
11. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 175 F.3d at 1033.
12. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
13. See Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON
REG. 283, 283-84 (1986). While the author of this Note recognizes that the nondelegation doctrine is not the sole basis for this discontent and that other doctrines have
been frequently invoked by the courts to attack agency interpretations, she seeks here

only to emphasize that the nondelegation doctrine is not a proper means for doing so.
14. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935);
Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
15. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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oriented" jurisprudence. 16 In other words, they use whatever means
necessary to achieve the desired result. In the process, the judiciary
has attempted to impede the growth of administrative authority and,
as a result, has bound the hands of Congress in areas where agency
expertise is essential, in an attempt to regain control of its once exclusive territory of determining what the law is.17 As final arbiters of the
16. Starr, supra note 13, at 293-94.
17. See United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 585-86 (1981) (White, J., dissenting)
("The Court today rejects the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation of §§ 611 and
613 and the applicable regulation because it has not 'suggested any rational basis for
linking the right to a depletion deduction to the period of time that the taxpayer
operates a mine."'); Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (per curiam) (invoking nondelegation doctrine and remanding case for EPA to
interpret § 109 in a manner consistent with the constitution); Int'l Union v. OSHA,
938 F.2d 1310, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Lockout/Tagout I) (finding that, in light of
nondelegation principles, the Secretary's interpretation was too broad); Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (vacating EPA regulations redefining the term "stationary source" ), rev'd sub nom. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578
F.2d 319, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting the EPA's plantwide definition-the bubble
concept-of "stationary source" under § 706(2)(C) of the Administrative Procedure
Act); Hearst Publ'ns v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1943) (reasoning that, in
the absence of a statutory definition, it "is exclusively a judicial function" to determine the meaning of a statute (citation omitted)), rev'd, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); see also
Starr, supra note 13, at 294. But see Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991)
("Congress does not violate the Constitution merely because it legislates in broad
terms, leaving a certain degree of discretion to executive or judicial actors."); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("[T]he separation-of-powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in particular, do not prevent Congress from
obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches."); Lichter v. United States, 334
U.S. 742, 785 (1948) ("It is not necessary that Congress supply administrative officials
with a specific formula for their guidance in a field where flexibility and the adaptation of the congressional policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence
of the program."); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) ("[T]he doctrine
of separation of powers [does not] deny to Congress power to direct that an administrative officer ... have ample latitude within which he is to ascertain the conditions
which Congress has made prerequisite to the operation of its legislative command.");
Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 617-18 (1944) ("Congress has entrusted the administration of the Act to the [Federal Power] Commission,
not to the courts. Apart from the requirements of judicial review it is not for us to
advise the Commission how to discharge its functions."); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943) ("We certainly have neither technical competence nor
legal authority to pronounce upon the wisdom of the course taken by the Commission." (quoting Bd. of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 548 (1942))); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) ("Congress has found it
frequently necessary to use officers of the Executive Branch, within defined limits, to
secure the exact effect intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting discretion in such
officers to make public regulations interpreting a statute and directing the details of
its execution .... " (citations omitted)); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892)
("'There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which
cannot be known to the law-making power, and must therefore be a subject of inquiry
and determination outside of the halls of legislation."' (quoting Commonwealth ex
rel. McClain v. Locke, 72 Pa. 491, 499 (1873))); Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 132
F.3d 1467, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review, 'an agency's predictive judgments about areas that are within the agency's
field of discretion and expertise' are entitled to 'particularly deferential' review, as
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Constitution, 18 the judiciary has essentially twisted the nondelegation
doctrine into new form, in effect overriding Congress and promoting
judicial legislation.
As will be shown, the facts of this case and application of the
Schechter test support the conclusion that the Clean Air Act, insofar
as promulgation of the NAAQS is concerned, does not contain an excessive delegation of legislative power to the EPA. The EPA is not
free to act in any manner it chooses. The Administrator must answer
to Congress, 19 the President,20 and the people.2" Moreover, according
to section 307 of the Clean Air Act, in reviewing the EPA's construclong as they are reasonable." (quoting Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1983))); Int'l Union v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665, 669
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (Lockout/Tagout II) (reasoning that, on remand, OSHA's interpretation of the Act "guides its choice of safety standards enough to satisfy the demands of
the nondelegation doctrine"); LaRouche v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 28 F.3d 137, 141
(D.C. Cir. 1994) ("It is precisely when a statute 'does not expressly address' the issue
at hand that the Supreme Court requires deference to an agency's filling of a statutory
gap." (citing Chevron US.A.Inc., 467 U.S. at 843)); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("It is simply not the court's role to 'secondguess the scientific judgments of the EPA."' (quoting New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d
574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1988))); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1184 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) ("The[ ]provisions of the [Clean Air] Act assign this court a restricted role
in reviewing air quality standards. The Administrator's construction of the Act will
be upheld if it is reasonable.") (citation omitted); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d
1130, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[T]he reviewing court may not substitute its judgment
for the agency's, and must affirm the agency's decision if a rational basis for it is
presented.") (citations omitted); Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 90 (D.C. Cir.
1978) ("Under the substantial evidence standard of review, EPA is not required to
'prove' its case in the reviewing court 'in some sense of weight of the evidence.' ... It
suffices that EPA's conclusions are supported by . . . 'relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [them]."') (citations omitted); Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Regulators such as the Administrator
must be accorded flexibility, a flexibility that recognizes the special judicial interest in
favor of protection of the health and welfare of people, even in areas where certainty
does not exist." (citing Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C.
Cir. 1971))); S.Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 677 (1st Cir. 1974) ("Administrative agencies are created by Congress because it is impossible for the Legislature to
acquire sufficient information to manage each detail in the long process of extirpating
the abuses identified by the legislation; the Agency must have flexibility to implement
the congressional mandate."); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp.
737, 745 (D.D.C. 1971) ("[Administrative] officials may lawfully be given far greater
authority than the power to recognize a triggering condition. .. ").
18. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
19. The Administrator derives her authority from Congress and may only act in
accordance with Congress' legislative mandates. Where Congress has not enabled the
Administrator to regulate, the Administrator is powerless to do so.
20. The Administrator is appointed by the President and may be removed by the
President. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Dec. 2, 1970), reprintedas
amended in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1551 (1994), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970); U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2; see also PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 89-90 (1989).
21. The Administrator, although not directly accountable, is indirectly accountable to the people through the President. A change in political control of the White
House will inevitably lead to a change in the EPA Administrator.
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tion of the Act, a reviewing court must apply the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review as well as the rational basis test.22 This did
not occur in American Trucking.
Part II of this paper discusses the background of both the nondelegation doctrine and the judicial deference doctrine. With respect to
the nondelegation doctrine, this section discusses the role of A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States in determining whether or not
an unlawful delegation has in fact occurred. Moreover, this section
will discuss the purpose of the nondelegation doctrine. With respect
to the deference doctrine, this section discusses the benefits of the deference doctrine, particularly in regards to administrative agency expertise and preservation of political accountability. Section II also
discusses separation of powers in relation to both of these doctrines,
specifically, the relationship between an administrative agency and the
executive branch and that interrelation with the judiciary.
Part III sets forth a statement of the case for American Trucking,
stating the relevant facts, procedural history, reasoning and dissent.
Part IV analyzes how the nondelegation doctrine was applied in
American Trucking, and how it should have been applied using the
test set out in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. After establishing that
no unlawful delegation was present, this section goes on to apply the
Chevron test and identifies the need to defer to the EPA. Part V discusses the Supreme Court's holding on the nondelegation issue.
Lastly, Part VI concludes that the judiciary should remain true to
the Constitution by refraining from applying the nondelegation doctrine to statutory interpretations. Additionally, due to the complexity
of many of our modern statutes, namely the Clean Air Act, Congress
necessarily must rely on an expert body to effectively carry out the
will of the people. Moreover, showing deference to administrative
agency interpretations does not grant the EPA, or any other administrative agency, power to make law as it sees fit. As long as Congress
provides adequate restraint on agency action, and as long as the
agency does not exceed its delegated authority, no constitutional infirmity can be found.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Nondelegation Doctrine

Although the nondelegation doctrine dates back to 1892,23 the first
and last time it was applied by the Supreme Court to strike down leg22. Clean Air Act § 307(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (1994); Lead Indus. Ass'n, 647
F.2d at 1145 (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281,
290 (1974)).
23. See Field v. Clark, 143, U.S. 649 (1892).
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islation was in 1935.24 In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,2 5 the United States Supreme Court looked to see what limits
were placed on delegated authority in the National Industrial Recovery Act and considered several factors to determine whether a delegation of power was in fact unconstitutional. 26 For instance, has
Congress provided standards to guide the administrative agency's actions?2 7 Does the act apply to a particular activity? 28 Does the act
29
provide for review of agency decisions, such as notice and hearing?
on findings of fact,
Does the act require that all standards be based
30
which are supported by an evidentiary record?
Where a court can answer these questions in the affirmative, no unconstitutional delegation exists. 3 ' Moreover, where an agency acts
pursuant to legislative purpose and intent and proper procedural safeguards are present, the court should not second-guess its judgment.3 2
Where a delegation satisfies the Constitution, it is only when an
agency acts contrary to congressional will or where its actions are
found to be arbitrary and capricious that a court may overrule its
decisions.3 3
Today, most courts and commentators agree that "Congress can
delegate to an agency only if the power is constrained by an intelligible principle that guides the decision maker."3 4 The Supreme Court
has upheld broad delegations guided by such standards as "public convenience, interest, or necessity," 35 "fair and equitable" prices, 36 "just
and reasonable" rates, 37 and "excessive" profits, 38 while the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has upheld equally broad
24. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan.
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); see also Nondelegation: The D.C. Circuit Resurrects Lazarus (Maybe), 20 No. 8 JUD./LEGIS. WATCH REP. 1 (1999), WL 20 No. 8
NLCPINEWS 1 [hereinafter Nondelegation].

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

295 U.S. 495 (1935).
See id. at 539-40.
See id. at 540.
See id.
Id. at 539-40.

30. Id.
31. See id. at 539-41.
32. "[A]s long as Congress delegates power to an agency to regulate on the borders of the unknown, courts cannot interfere with reasonable interpretations of equivocal evidence." Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 972 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1505
(D.C. Cir. 1986)).
33. See Clean Air Act § 307(d)(9), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (1994); Lead Indus.
Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
34. Nondelegation, supra note 24, at 1; J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
35. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
36. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427 (1944).
37. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600 (1944).
38. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778 (1948).
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delegations such as "compelling public interest."39 Therefore, as long
as Congress legislates and provides the standards of legal obligation,
i.e., what must be done or what the statute must accomplish, and
merely requires the assistance of an expert body in the implementation of the statute, the nondelegation doctrine has not been violated.40
Today, Congress relies heavily on administrative agencies to promulgate subordinate rules or standards that have the binding force of
law. Recognizing the expertise necessary to effectively carry out its
mandate, Congress delegates that responsibility to administrative
agencies that, through specialized knowledge and experience, are
more able to identify and address the minute details that could inhibit
effective enforcement of Congressional will.41
Undoubtedly, there will be some that abhor any delegation of legislative power. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that "Congress is
not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is ... vested. [The Court has, however,]
repeatedly recognized the necessity of adapting legislation to complex
conditions involving a host of details with which the national legislature cannot deal directly."42 Moreover, the Court has recognized that:
the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress
the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making
of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination
of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to
apply.43
In fact, as long as Congress lays down an intelligible principle to which
the person or body must conform, the action is not an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.44
B. Judicial Deference Doctrine
In Chevron, the Supreme Court breathed new life into the judicial
deference doctrine. Recognizing the need to provide Congress with
the freedom to elicit specialized help from the executive branch,
through administrative agencies, the Court sought to reign in lower
federal courts whose goal seemed to be to restrict administrative
39. Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 132 F.3d 1467, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
40. See Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935).
41. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
42. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 529-30. Accord Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
43. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 530 (citing Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at
421).
44. See Touby, 500 U.S. at 165; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372; Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S.
at 429-30; J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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agency authority.45 While lower courts have found new ways to get
around this doctrine, such as applying the nondelegation doctrine to
statutory interpretations, Chevron remains good law.
Although "[a]n important function of the modern judiciary is to ensure that decisions by administrative agencies remain within statutory
boundaries ... federal courts sometimes defer to statutory interpreta-

tions made by the implementing agencies"46 due to the agencies' extensive knowledge and experience in working with the particular
statute. As recognized by one commentator, this deference should
lend comfort to a judiciary that may be fraught with fear that their
decisions involving complex technical data and scientific uncertainty
are incorrect.47 Other courts, however, detest the very fact that an
administrative agency is allowed to carry out an essentially judicial
function-saying what the law is through interpreting the complex
statutes they are charged with administering.4" Herein lies the problem. While the Constitution does not forbid delegations guided by
congressional will, some courts remain overprotective of the territory
once within their exclusive domain and deny proper consideration to
agency interpretations.
To ease the tension between lower federal courts and administrative
agencies, in Chevron the Supreme Court resolved the question of
when deference was appropriate. In that case, the Court held that,
when reviewing an agency's construction of a statute it is charged with
administering, the Court must ask two questions. 49 First, "[W]hether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."50 If
Congress has spoken on the issue and its intent is clear, its intent is
controlling.51 If, however, Congress has not spoken on the precise
question at issue, the court may not substitute its own construction for
that of the agency.52 Second, "[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat-

45. See Starr, supra note 13, at 294.
46. Id. at 283.
47. See Patricia G. Chapman, Has the Chevron Doctrine Run Out of Gas? Senza
Ripieni Use of Chevron Deference or the Rule of Lenity, 19 Miss. C. L. REV. 115, 158

(1998). "[T]he CWA is a lengthy and complex statute... [which] often require[s] the
evaluation of sophisticated data.... [I]n reviewing EPA's actions,.., this court does
not sit as a scientific body, meticulously reviewing all data under a laboratory microscope." Id. at n.284 (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395,
1401 (4th Cir. 1993)).
48. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
49. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
50. Id.

51. Id. at 842-43.
52. Id. at 843.
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ute."53 Again, the legislative intent and the purpose of the statute are
controlling.
Moreover, the Chevron Court recognized the necessity for administrative agencies that are charged with administering congressional
programs to formulate policy and provide rules or regulations to fill in
the gaps left by Congress.54 Where Congress expressly delegates this
gap-filling function to the agency, the agency's "regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute."55 Here, the relevant inquiry is whether the
agency stayed within the framework laid out by Congress, giving its
intent full effect.
A long line of Supreme Court cases admits that "considerable
weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer."5 6 Moreover, the
Court recognizes that the principle of deference has been consistently
applied to administrative interpretations involving matters dependant
upon extraordinary knowledge.5 7 According to one commentator:
Chevron not only reaffirmed the deference principle but buttressed it in several ways. First, it removed a long-standing ambiguity in the law resulting from the existence of two distinct lines of
cases, one calling for deference, the other disregarding deference
altogether. Second, it eliminated much of the courts' authority to
invalidate agency interpretations based on perceived inconsistencies
with congressional policies. Third, it specified certain conditions
53. Id. The Court goes on to state that it "need not conclude that the agency
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially
had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Id. at n.11.
54. Id. (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
55. Id. at 844.

56. Id. & n.14.
57. See id.; see also NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, Inc., 344 U.S. 344,
346 (1953) ("In fashioning remedies ....

the Board must draw on enlightenment

gained from experience."); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800
(1945) ("One of the purposes which lead to the creation of such boards is to have
decisions.., made by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject which is entrusted to their administration." (citing NLRB v.
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 479 (1941); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322
U.S. 111, 130 (1944))); Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. at 131 (stating that since the
Board is familiar with various employment relationships, its determination of the
meaning of a "broad statutory term" will be upheld if it "has 'warrant in the record'
and a reasonable basis in law"), overruled by Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
ch. 120, sec. 101, § 2, 61 Stat. 136, 137-40 (1947) (amending statutory definition of
employee, overruling Hearst by explicitly excluding independent contractors and supervisory employees); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943)
(stating that the Court's "duty is at an end when [it] find[s] that the action of the
Commission was based upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant
to authority granted by Congress"); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943)
(stating that "an appellate court cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has
exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency").
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under which courts
58 are required to give controlling weight to agency
interpretations.
"Despite its strengthening of the deference principle, however,
Chevron has not made judicial review a dead letter. On the contrary,
as the Court's own post-Chevron decisions demonstrate, application
of the Chevron framework-particularly its first step-continues to be
a potent check on agency interpretations." 59 In effect, the purpose of
Chevron was to narrow the scope of judicial review of agency interpretations of complex statutes and remind lower courts that their role
is not one of supervision.6" In fact, as one author suggests, Chevron
actually redistributed powers among Congress, administrative agencies, and the courts.61
C. Separation of Powers
The framers of the Constitution created three separate branchesthe legislative, 62 the executive,63 and the judicial'-which together
form our national government. Over the years, the lines separating
these branches have blurred as increasingly complex times have called
for increased governmental coordination.65 One of the byproducts of
this governmental coordination is the administrative state. The EPA,
for example, is answerable to the Executive while it is responsible for
implementing the laws written by Congress. In any event, policy, or
politics if you will, plays an important role in agency decisions. Consequently, the EPA, its Administrator, and the President are politically
accountable for decisions rendered by the agency. 66 This political accountability is an important facet of our democratic system of
government.
Although statutory interpretation was formerly conducted exclusively by the judiciary, even when determinations of policy were involved, some saw the rise of the administrative state as a repudiation
of judicial regulation. 67 Not only did the courts lack flexibility, expertise, and powers of coordination, but they also lacked democratic ac58. Starr, supra note 13, at 292.
59. Id. at 298.
60. See id. at 284.

61. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv.
2071, 2075 (1990).
62. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1.
63. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
64. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
65. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
66. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
67. See Sunstein, supra note 61, at 2079.
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countability.6 8 The new administrative state combined all of these,
but most importantly, it preserved democratic accountability.
While Marbury v. Madison69 was the premier case for determining
the scope of judicial authority, Chevron is the premier case for determining the scope of administrative agency authority, and the limitations of judicial review in this regard. 70 Not only is Chevron a check
on administrative agency authority, but it also serves as a check on
judicial legislating. In Chevron, the Supreme Court sought to remove
the unelected judiciary from decisions that were essentially political.
"Judges 'are not part of either political branch,' and they 'have no
constituency.' On the other hand, although agencies are 'not directly
accountable to the people,' they are subject to the general oversight
and supervision of the President, who is a nationally elected public
official."7 1
Because federal judges lack democratic accountability, one commentator says that they "have a duty voluntarily to exercise 'judicial
restraint,' that is, to avoid intrusions not clearly mandated by Congress or the Constitution into the processes and decisions of any other
branch. '72 This is especially true where agency decisions result from
policy judgments. Hence, "[u]nelected judges should leave the executive branch free to pursue, within appropriate bounds, what it perceives to be the will of the people. If Congress disagrees . . . , the
proper response lies ... in drafting clearer laws and amending vague
ones." 73 In this regard, Chevron maintains the balance of power and
prevents the scales from tipping in favor of either the courts or administrative agencies.
As Supreme Court Justice Jackson once wrote, "Some clauses [of
the Constitution] could be made almost unworkable, as well as immutable, by refusal to indulge some latitude of interpretation for changing times."7 4 Moreover, in his concurring opinion in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson wrote:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from
context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
68. See id.
69. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
70. See generally Sunstein, supra note 61, at 2075.
71. Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation ProEnvironmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better Than Judicial
Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1244 (1996) (citations omitted).
72. Starr, supra note 13, at 308.

73. Id. at 312.
74. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson,

J., concurring).
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separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.
Therefore, recognizing that the decisions of administrative agencies
are in large part a result of political push-and-pull and, as a result, may
be temporary, the judiciary should not intervene unless the tools used
by the judiciary will ensure that they do not impinge on the political
processes. In fact, where an agency is carrying out its lawfully delegated functions and, in the process, must use its discretion in furtherance of national policy, the deference doctrine articulated in Chevron
is an essential tool. Chevron will prevent an administrative agency
from exceeding its delegated authority while ensuring that the judiciary does not usurp legislative power.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Relevant Facts

In July 1997, the EPA issued final rules revising the NAAQS for
particulate matter and ozone.7 6 Numerous petitions for review were
filed for each rule. 77 "Certain 'Small Business Petitioners' [have] argue[d] in each case that EPA has construed §§ 108 & 109 of the Clean
Air Act so loosely as to render them unconstitutional delegations of
legislative power. ' ' 78 The court agreed.7 9
In setting the NAAQS for non-threshold pollutants, the EPA uses
several criteria for assessing health effects. "They are [1] 'the nature
and severity of the health effects involved, [2] the size of the sensitive
population(s) at risk, [3] the types of health information available, and
[4] the kind and degree of uncertainties that must be addressed." 8
Although the court found these criteria reasonable, they also found
them to be incomplete. 8
The court also reasoned that the level of uncertainty apparent in the
EPA's reasoning allows the EPA to set the standard at zero or as high
as the level "associated with London's 'Killer Fog' of 1952. ' 's 2 Due to
this presumed lack of constraint, the court stated that the "EPA's formulation of its policy judgment leaves it free to pick any point be75. Id. at 635.
76. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 40 C.F.R.
§ 50.7 (2000); National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9,
50.10 (2000).
77. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1999), reh'g denied on nondelegation issue, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

78. Id. at 1034.
79. Id.

80. Id. at 1034-35; see also National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62
Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,883 (July 18, 1997) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
81. Am. Trucking Ass'ns., 175 F.3d at 1034.

82. Id. at 1036.
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tween zero and a hair below the concentrations yielding London's
Killer Fog." 83

Because the court found that the agency had failed to articulate an
"intelligible principle" constraining its actions,84 it held that the EPA's
interpretation of the Clean Air Act amounted to an unconstitutional
delegation of power.8 5 In response, the court remanded the rules to
the EPA so the agency could "develop a construction of the act that
satisfies [the] constitutional requirement."86
B. ProceduralHistory
Numerous petitions for review were filed with the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit with respectto the revised NAAQS.87 The court
held that the NAAQS were promulgated pursuant to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and remanded the rules to the
EPA for an interpretation consistent with the Constitution.
A Petition for Rehearing and a Petition for Rehearing En Banc was
filed on June 28, 1999 by the United States Department of Justice on
behalf of the EPA.88 Although the EPA was granted a rehearing,
which was filed on October 29, 1999,89 the court declined to rule on
the nondelegation issue. 90

The United States Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari to
hear the case.9 ' Arguments were heard on November 7, 2000.92 As

this Note was being prepared for publication, the Supreme Court decided the case. 93 The case was affirmed in part and reversed in part.94
C. Reasoning
The court reasoned that the criteria used by the EPA to assess
health effects when setting the NAAQS for non-threshold pollutants
are so imprecise that they only "support the intuitive proposition that
more pollution will not benefit public health, not that keeping pollu83. Id. at 1037.

84. Id. at 1034.
85. Id. at 1033-34.
86. Id. at 1033.
87. Id.

88. See Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc for the United
States Environmental Protection Agency, Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA), 195 F.3d 4
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (No. 97-1440), at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/gen/concstat.pdf.
89. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
90. Id. at 6.
91. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 68 U.S.L.W. 3719 (U.S. May 23, 2000) (No. 991257), and Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Browner, 68 U.S.L.W. 3735 (U.S. May 30, 2000)
(No. 99-1426). Both cases were consolidated for oral argument. 68 U.S.L.W. at 3739.
92. Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 69 U.S.L.W. 3351 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2000) (Nos.
99-1257 and 99-1426).
93. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001).
94. Id. at 919.
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tion at or below any particular level is 'requisite' or not requisite to
'protect the public health' with an 'adequate margin of safety."' 95
Furthermore, the court said that "[f]or EPA to pick any non-zero level
it must explain the degree of imperfection permitted."96 While the
court found no inherent nondelegation problem with "[t]he factors
that EPA has elected to examine for this purpose," 97 the court reasoned that the "EPA lacks.., any determinate criterion for drawing
lines. It has failed to state intelligibly how much is too much."9 8
By using these factors in its analysis, the court reasoned, the "EPA's
explanations for its decisions amount to assertions that a less stringent
standard would allow the relevant pollutant to inflict a greater quantum of harm on public health, and that a more stringent standard
would result in less harm."9 9 Furthermore, the court seemed to hint at
the lack of support for the EPA's decisions.1°°
The court also stated that the question whether or not the EPA was
acting pursuant to lawfully delegated authority was not grounded in
In essence, the court argued that whether or not the rescience.'l
vised NAAQS were promulgated according to sound medical studies
and scientific evidence on the effects of ozone and particulate matter
on humans was irrelevant in the absence of a clearly articulated "intelligible principle" derived from the Clean Air Act itself."0 2
Moreover, according to the court, "[t]he principle EPA invokes for
each increment in stringency . . . -that *itis 'possible, but not certain'
that health effects exist at that level, -could as easily, for any nonthreshold pollutant, justify a standard of zero. The same indeterminacy prevails in EPA's decisions not to pick a still more stringent
level."' 0 3 While the court recognized that it is a question of degree,
the court stated that the EPA "offers no intelligible principle by which
to identify a stopping point."'0 4
The court also distinguished the cases relied upon by the EPA that
held the "EPA may use its discretion to make the 'policy judgment' to
set the standards at one point within the relevant range rather than
another." 10 5 The court dismissed the relevance of the cases because
they did not involve a claim of unlawful delegation. 0 6
95. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 175 F.3d at 1035.
96. Id. at 1034.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1035.
100. See id. at 1035-36.
101. Id. at 1036.
102. See id.
103. Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 1037.
105. Id.
106. Id. (discussing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 969 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and
Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
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While the court acknowledged that the EPA may only consider
"health effects relating to pollutants in the air,"'1 7 it advised that "an
agency wielding the power over American life possessed by EPA
should be capable of developing the rough equivalent of a generic unit
of harm that takes into account population affected, severity and
probability."'0 8 In the alternative, the court stated that the EPA could
look to Congress for ratification of its choice.' 0 9
D.

Dissent

In his dissent, Judge Tatel admonished the majority for "ignor[ing]
the last half-century of Supreme Court nondelegation jurisprudence.""'
The dissent also argued that section 109 does cabin the
EPA's discretion, and reminded the majority that the D.C. Circuit has
reviewed the Act at least ten times and has "delineat[ed] EPA authority in the NAAQS setting process."''
The dissent also pointed out sections of other acts containing even
broader delegations that were sustained by the D.C. Circuit, as well as
the Supreme Court."' As Judge Tatel points out:
The Agency has been given a well defined task by Congress-to
reduce pollution to levels "requisite to protect the public health", in
the case of primary standards. The Clean Air Act outlines the approach to be followed by the Agency and describes in detail many
of its powers .... Yet there are many benchmarks to guide the
Agency and the courts in determining whether or not EPA is exceeding its powers, not the least of which is that the rationality of
the means can be tested against goals
capable of fairly precise defi3
nition in the language of science.'
The dissent also pointed out that the EPA's discretion in setting
standards "requisite to protect the public health" is not unlimited." 4
Judge Tatel stated that:
[t]he Clean Air Act directs EPA to base standards on "air quality
criteria" that "accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on
public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence
5
of such pollutant in the ambient air, in varying quantities.""
107. Id. at 1038.
108. Id. at 1039.
109. Id. at 1040.
110. Id. at 1057 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. See id.; supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
113. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 175 F.3d at 1058 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing S. Terminal
Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1057.
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Furthermore, added Judge Tatel, "the principles constraining EPA discretion are at least as specific as those this court sustained in International Union, UAW v. OSHA.""' 6
Not only was the EPA constrained by the statute, but it also used
the guidelines published by the American Thoracic Society to identify
which health effects were "significant enough" to warrant protection." 7 Furthermore, the EPA "set the ozone and fine particle standards within ranges recommended by CASAC, the independent
scientific advisory committee created pursuant to section 109 of the
Act.""' 8 While the majority concluded that the EPA must explain any
non-zero standard," 9 the dissent added that the "EPA must explain
any departures from CASAC's recommendations. Bringing scientific
methods to their evaluation of the Agency's Criteria Document and
Staff Paper, CASAC provides an objective justification for the pollution standards the Agency selects."' 20

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Nondelegation Doctrine - As Applied

In applying the nondelegation doctrine in American Trucking, the
court failed to address any of the factors articulated in Schechter. Instead, the court only sought to prove that the EPA did not articulate
an "intelligible principle" constraining its actions.' 2 ' Specifically, the
court opined that no intelligible principle guided the EPA's policy
judgments in choosing among alternative standards. 2 2 Furthermore,
it rejected the EPA's argument that the major principle guiding its
promulgation of the NAAQS was the requirement that the standards
be set at a level "requisite to protect the public health" with an "adequate margin of safety."' 2 3 As recognized by the dissent, the court
rejected this principle even though it "is narrower and more principled than delegations the Supreme Court and [the D.C. Circuit] have
upheld since Schechter Poultry.' 24 By not allowing the EPA to use its
expertise to apply the scientific data in choosing among standards, the
court eliminated the need for Congress to elicit help from the agency
in the first place.
According to the court in American Trucking, there are three basic
rationales under the nondelegation doctrine for applying the "intelli116. Id. at 1058-59; see also Int'l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665, 669 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) ("Lockout/Tagout II").
117. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 175 F.3d at 1059.
118. Id.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See id. at 1034.
Id. at 1059 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1034.
See id. at 1036-37.
See id. at 1034-35.
Id. at 1057.
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gible principle" standard to an administrative agency. 125 First, "[i]f
the agency develops determinate, binding standards for itself, it is less
likely to exercise the delegated authority arbitrarily. [Second], such
standards enhance the likelihood that meaningful judicial review will
prove feasible.' 1 26 Finally, according to the court, "the third key function of [the] non-delegation doctrine, [is] to 'ensure[ ] to the extent
consistent with orderly governmental administration that important
choices of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Gov27
ernment most responsive to the popular will." 1
The very essence of the nondelegation doctrine is that Congress
may not abdicate its law-making responsibility to another branch of
the government. 128 The Constitution does not require that every action taken by an agency be guided by an intelligible principle. All the
Constitution requires is that Congress provide an intelligible principle,
a framework, to guide the agency in implementing the act. 12 9 Therefore, for the nondelegation doctrine to be brought in issue, Congress
must first delegate authority and that authority must be contrary to
the Constitution. Where, as here, an administrative agency must promulgate rules pursuant to a complex statutory scheme, and the administrative agency must base its standards on complex scientific and
technical data, the court should not endeavor to interpret the data to
determine whether the agency is acting pursuant to constitutionally
delegated authority. Instead, it should look first to the statute to determine whether a delegation is present. Second, if a delegation is
present, it should determine whether the delegation is properly
restrained.
B.

The Nondelegation Doctrine - A Systematic Approach

In 1935, the Supreme Court established standards for reviewing
congressional delegations to determine their constitutionality. 13 0 According to the Court, Congress must establish the standards of legal
obligation for the agency to prevent the delegation from offending the
Constitution.' 3 ' To determine whether these legal obligations are present, the court should look at: (1) whether Congress prescribed stan125. See id. at 1038.
126. Id. (citation omitted).
127. Id. (quoting Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 685 (1980)).
128. Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935); see Touby v. United States, 500 U.S.
160, 165 (1991); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1944); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 408 (1928); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971).
129. See J. W. Hampton,Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 409; Nondelegation, supra note 24, at
1.
130. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 530-40.
131. See id. at 530.
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dards for the agency's conduct; 132 (2) whether the administrative
agency is required to act on notice and hearing, or some other form of
review; 133 and (3)whether the agency's decisions are supported by
findings of fact which are supported by evidence. 3 4 Moreover, the
Court reasoned that where the "authority conferred has direct relation to the1standards
prescribed" by the act, an "intelligible principle"
35
is present.
1. Statutorily Prescribed Standards
In the present case, the Court must evaluate the Clean Air Act to
determine if the above limitations are present. The overriding standard can be found in the congressional declaration of purpose. 3 6 In
relation to the Air Quality Criteria and Control Techniques, 3 7 which
are used in promulgating the NAAQS, numerous standards guide
agency action. First, EPA must issue an air quality criteria document
which must "accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in
indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public
health or welfare which may be expected from the presence of such
pollutant in the ambient air, in varying quantities.' 38 Second, Congress also specifies the information that should be included in the criteria document. 1 39 Third, Congress provides for the creation of a
scientific advisory committee to provide confirmation of scientific evidence and to make recommendations therefrom. 4 ° Specifically, the
Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) is responsible for
(i) advis[ing] the Administrator of areas in which additional knowledge is required to appraise the adequacy and basis of existing, new,
or revised [NAAQS], (ii) describ[ing] the research efforts necessary
to provide the required information, (iii) advis[ing] the Administrator on the relative contribution to air pollution concentrations of
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See id.
See id. at 539
Id.
Id. at 540.
The purposes of this subchapter are(1) to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as
to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its
population;
(2) to initiate and accelerate a national research and development program to achieve the prevention and control of air pollution;
(3) to provide technical and financial assistance to State and local governments in connection with the development and execution of their air pollution prevention and control programs; and
(4) to encourage and assist the development and operation of regional air
pollution prevention and control programs.
Clean Air Act § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (1994).
137. Id. § 7408.
138. Id. § 7408(a)(2).
139. Id. § 7408(a)(2).
140. See id. § 7409(d)(2).
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natural as well as anthropogenic activity, 141 and (iv) advis[ing] the
Administrator of any adverse public health, welfare, social, economic, or energy effects which may result from various strategies
for attainment and maintenance of such [NAAQS].' 4 2

Section 109 of the Act provides for promulgation of the National
Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards. 143 In this
section, Congress requires the EPA to set the primary standards at
levels "requisite to protect the public health" with an "adequate margin of safety.' 44 Additionally, secondary standards must be set at
levels "requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air.' 1 45 Moreover, Congress requires that the
146
standards be based on evidence contained in the criteria document.
Also, this section mandates that the EPA "shall appoint an independent scientific review committee composed of seven members including at least one member of the National Academy of Sciences, one
physician, and one person representing State air pollution control
agencies.' 1 47 Moreover, Congress places the burden of review of the
criteria on the scientific review committee and also mandates that the
committee "shall recommend to the Administrator any new national
ambient air148quality standards and revisions of existing criteria and
standards.'
Not only is the EPA constrained by the above-mentioned provisions
of the Clean Air Act, it is also constrained by section 103 of the
Act.149 This section lays the groundwork for EPA environmental research and investigation.' 50 Most notably, this section directs the Administrator to "conduct a research program on the short-term and
long-term effects of air pollutants, including wood smoke, on human
health."''
2. Review Process
Starting first with section 108, Congress directs the EPA to publish a
list of air pollutants that may pose a threat to human health or welfare.' 52 Next, Congress requires that the agency provide state pollu141. Anthropogenic activity is man-made activity, as opposed to that activity occurring in nature. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE
59 (David B. Guralnik ed., 2d College ed. 1986).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(C).
143. Id. § 7409(a)(1)(A).
144. Id. § 7409(b)(1).
145. Id. § 7409(b)(2).
146. See id. § 7409(a)-(b).
147. Id. § 7409(d)(2)(A).
148. Id. § 7409(d)(2)(B).
149. Id. § 7403.
150. See id.
151. Id. § 7403(d)(1).
152. Id. § 7408(a)(1)(A).
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tion control agencies information on pollution control techniques that
will be helpful in attaining the NAAQS.' 53 Moreover, this section requires that the "issuance of air quality criteria and information on air
pollution control techniques shall be announced in the Federal Register and copies shall be made available to the general public."' 54
Next, section 109 states that the EPA shall publish its proposed
NAAQS and allow a maximum of ninety days for public comment.' 55
At the expiration of the 90-day period, the EPA is directed to promulgate the proposed rules. 156 Last, but not least, the states have the last
laugh. It is the states that are responsible for the implementation of
the NAAQS and the states get to decide on the57method of attainment,
time of attainment, and who bears the coStS.1
3. Evidentiary Support
As noted above, the creation of the criteria document provides the
findings of health effects from the various air pollutants. 58 The criteria document is a compilation of scientific studies documenting the
various health effects caused by the pollutants listed pursuant to section 108(a)(1).15 9 Moreover, the studies incorporated into the criteria
document are themselves findings of fact.
To add to the weight of the evidence, CASAC reviews the evidence
and makes recommendations for EPA action in the standard setting
process. 160 Therefore, as long as the NAAQS are promulgated in accordance with the criteria document, they are supported by the
evidence.
4. Is an "Intelligible Principle" Present?
Yes! Adequate standards exist to prevent the EPA from usurping
legislative power. As discussed above, the Clean Air Act commands
the Administrator of the EPA to promulgate and periodically revise
the NAAQS. The Act also tells the EPA how to do it, leaving only
discretion in choosing the standard. Furthermore, the standards laid
out above are directly related to this task and constrain the EPA decision-making authority.
C. An Exercise in Judicial Deference
The leading authority on analyzing an administrative agency's statutory interpretation, Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense
153. See id. § 7408(b)(1).
154. Id. § 7408(d).
155. Id. § 7409(a)(1).

156. Id. § 7409(a)(1)(B).
157. See id. § 7401(a)(3); id. § 7410(a).
158. Id. § 7408(a)(2).

159. Id.
160. Id. § 7409(d)(2)(B).
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Council, Inc.16 1 was not even mentioned by the court in its analysis,
nor was its two-part test applied. Although the nondelegation doctrine does require articulation of an "intelligible principle," that responsibility lies with Congress, not with the administrative agency it is
meant to guide. In other words, Congress must articulate a framework or set of guidelines within which the administrative agency may
act. They are not required to spell out every step the Agency may
take within that framework.
In Chevron, the Supreme Court developed a two-part test for reviewing agencies' statutory interpretations. 162 In this landmark decision, the Court stated:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible con1 63
struction of the statute.
1. Has Congress Spoken on the Precise Issue?
a.

The Statute on its Face

The Clean Air Act does not speak to the level of uncertainty, or
degree of imperfection, that is permitted in the formulation of the
NAAQS. With respect to the primary NAAQS, all that Congress requires is that they be set at levels requisite to protect the public health
with an adequate margin of safety. 164 With respect to the secondary
standards, Congress requires that they be set at levels "requisite to
protect the public welfare.' 1 65 Congress does, however, explicitly
delegate discretionary authority to the EPA to fill in this gap. According to the statute, the standards chosen must be those which, "in the
judgment of the Administrator," are sufficient to provide for the level
166
of safety demanded by Congress.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842-43.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
Id. § 7409(b)(2).
Id. § 7409(b) (emphasis added).
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b.

CongressionalIntent

Through the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,167 Congress
sought to clarify the role of the EPA Administrator in promulgating
Foreign Commerce
the NAAQS. The Committee on Interstate and
168 in section 102169 of
referred),
was
amendment
for
bill
(to whom the
the Bill, summarized its reasons for adopting section 102 as follows:
A. To emphasize the preventive or precautionary nature of the
act, i.e., to assure that regulatory action can effectively prevent
harm before it occurs; to emphasize the predominant value of protection of public health;
B. To authorize the Administratorto weigh risks and make reasonable projections of future trends; thus, to find a middle road between those who would impose a nearly impossible standard of
proof on the Administrator before he may move to protect public
health and those who would shift the burden of proof for all pollutants to make the pollution source prove the safety of its emissions
as a condition of operation;
F. To reflect awareness of the uncertainties and limitations in
the data which will be available to the. Administrator in the foreseeable future to enable him to execute his rulemaking duties under
this act, because of the limitations on research resources and the fact
that decisionmaking about the risks to public health from air pollution falls on "the frontiers of scientific and medical knowledge"; to
provide for adequate judicialreview of the reasonableness of the Administrator'sjudgment in assessing risks, while restrainingthe courts
from attempting to act "as the equivalent of a combined Ph.D. in
chemistry, biology, and statistics" or from applying a standardof reappropriateonly to review of adjudications or formal
view which is
170
fact finding.
Moreover, the Committee stated that these purposes are in line
with most judicial interpretations of the Clean Air Act. 171 According
to the Committee, the reason they included the words "in the judgment of the Administrator" in section 109 of the Act was to affirm this
view.172 In fact, the committee has rejected efforts to have this language removed 1 73 and stated that "the . . . language is intended to
emphasize the necessarily judgmental element in the task of predict167. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
168. H.R. REP. No. 95-294 at 1 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1079.
169. This section is titled "Basis of Administrative Standards." Id. at 43, reprinted
in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1121.
170. H.R. REP. No. 95-294 at 49-50 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077,
1127-28 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
171. Id. at 50, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1128.
172. Id. at 51, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1129.
173. Id.
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ing future health risks of present action and to confer upon the
Ad1' 74
ministrator the requisite authority to exercise such judgment.'
For the foregoing reasons, the court's review should proceed to an
evaluation based in reason. Although legislative intent is silent with
respect to the degree of imperfection permitted in the NAAQS, what
is clear is that Congress intended to confer discretionary authority to
the EPA for exactly this purpose.
2.

Is the EPA's Decision Based on a Permissible
of the Clean Air Act?

75

Construction

According to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
yes! In its report, the Committee affirmed the view that "[m]ost other
courts have held that a substantial element of judgment, including
making comparative assessment[s] of risks,.., extrapolating from limited data, etc., are necessary and permissible under the act in order to
protect public
health and encourage development of new
1' 76
technology.'
Since choosing among standards necessarily involves making comparative assessments of risks, and therefore discretionary judgment on
the part of the EPA, actions in this regard are permissible under the
Act. Hence, under the Committee's view, choosing between standards is a judgment call for the Administrator, not for the courts.
V.

U.S. SUPREME COURT DISPOSITION

On February 27, 2001, the Supreme Court decided this case 1 7 7 and
addressed the nondelegation issue in part III of the opinion.178 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia stated that "[i]n a delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated
legislative power to the agency.'1 79 Moreover, he wrote that "[the
Court has] never suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute."' ° Rather, he emphasized that Congress is
174. Id.
175. According to the Court, "permissible" is a test of reasonableness, i.e., is the
agency's interpretation reasonable. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
176. H.R. REP. No. 95-294 at 50-51 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077,
1128-29 (emphasis added).
177. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001), rev'g on nondelegation
issue 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
178. Id. at 911-14.
179. Id. at 912.
180. Id. Justice Scalia further stated:
The idea that an agency can cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power seems to us internally contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the power to
exercise-that is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had
omitted-would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority.
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the body that must "lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle." 18 '
The Court further concluded that the level of discretion allowed by
section 109(b)(1) was well within the limits set by its previous decisions. As Justice Scalia put it, the Court has "'almost never felt qualified to second guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of
policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the
law."' 1 82 Moreover, although the Court recognized that the scope of
the power conferred on the agency is determinative of the level of
agency discretion allowed, it also noted that "even in sweeping regulatory schemes [it has] never demanded, as the Court of Appeals did
for saying 'how
here, that statutes provide a 'determinate criterion'
83
much [of the regulated harm] is too much."1
VI.

CONCLUSION

The contorted version of the nondelegation doctrine applied by the
D.C. Circuit in American Trucking finds support, not in the Constitution, but in the judicial legislation that created it. Not only does it
prevent Congress from eliciting help from the EPA on complex environmental issues, issues that the EPA is better equipped to handle, but
it also diminishes the democratic accountability that the framers of the
Constitution sought to protect.
To remedy this injustice, use of the nondelegation doctrine should
be restricted to delegations originating in Congress. As Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia indicated, administrative agencies have
no power to correct unlawful delegations. 18 4 That responsibility lies
with Congress. 185 As long as Congress performs its essential legislative functions, the nondelegation doctrine has not been violated. This
is particularly true where Congress has made it clear that the judiciary
must allow the administrative agency some degree of latitude.
Where, as in American Trucking, an administrative agency interpretation is at issue, the reviewing court should apply the Chevron test to
determine if the agency is acting pursuant to legislative intent. Not
only does Chevron allow the court to strike down any rules not in
conformity with congressional intent, but it also ensures that congressional will, the free will of the people, will prevail. But in no event
should a court strike down rules promulgated by an administrative
Whether the statute delegates legislative power is a question for the courts,
and an agency's voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the answer.
Id.
181. Id. (citation omitted).
182. Id. at 913 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); id. at 373 (majority opinion)).
183. Id. (quoting Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(per curiam) (second alteration in original)).
184. Id. at 912.
185. See id.
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agency on the basis of the nondelegation doctrine without consulting
the statute itself. The proper course of action is to apply the Chevron
test. The first prong of this test necessarily requires an examination of
the statute and will reveal any excessive delegations present. Where
none is present, the court should determine whether the rules promulgated are consistent with congressional intent. If they are, the court
should only concern itself with whether the agency's interpretation is
reasonable. If they are not, the actions of the agency in promulgating
the rules may be deemed arbitrary and capricious and the rules should
be struck down on those grounds.
Tracey L. Cloutier
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